OT ThreeMileIsland info for noncompos

Cue P. · Jul 22, 2009

Non-
Your email address in the Mike Douglas thread was incomplete so here's what i have on TMI. Dont know your source but being a consultant whose job is a result of the TMI and Brown's Ferry accidents, i'm pretty familiar with the whole issue. TMI was not and never could have been Chernobyl. Go here for the best explanation:
http://www.heritage.org/research/energyandenvironment/wm2367.cfm
Others - sorry for the OT intrusion but I could not email the fellow otherwise.

glennster · Jul 22, 2009

dont know about the tmi plant, but i worked at lasalle nuke during construction in the mid "70s. lasalle was the same plant as browns ferry. the scuttlebutt was browns ferry had a fire in the spreader room, under the main control room. what we were told was that browns ferry spreader room after cnstruction was filled with some type of foam and sealed so no one could accesss the wiring. lasalle"s spreader room was not sealed in that manner.

Ken Macfarlane · Jul 22, 2009

You won't find candles available for checking drafts now either. Also, cable sealing now is done with fire stopping materials, not combustibles.

Hot works are huge ordeals in nuke plants now. Even using bimetal holes saws is hotworks as they throw sparks.

MarkB_MI · Jul 22, 2009

Saying that Three Mile Island could never be Chernobyl is a bit like saying "cancer could never be gangrene": neither one is something you hope to experience.

Cue P. · Jul 23, 2009

In a nutshell, Brown’s Ferry fire was started by someone inspecting cable penetration seals in the cable spreading room with a candle or other open flame. If the flame blew, there was a seal leak. Unfortunately the flame was drawn in or made contact with the seal foam and ignited it. Further complications arose when the workers tried to extinguish the fire themselves plus did not notify the control room of the fire. The control room began seeing odd instrument readings (due to the failing cable insulation and subsequent short circuits). The fire brigade was notified but was unsure whether they should douse the cables with water. This progressed for 5 or more hours in which more cables burned. Eventually the offsite fire dept was called and extinguished the fire. This resulted in a whole new method of fire protection, fire modeling and procedures to deal with every possible worst case fire scenario a nuke plant could experience.

nonxcompos · Jul 23, 2009

Cue:Sorry about bad email (I do spell better than I type)...([email protected])
(1)TMI/Chernobyl: Of course, you're absolutely correct; they're completely different designs. My meaning was that TMI could've resulted in sufficiently high radiation releases that evacuation and massive cleanup would've been required. I'm aware industry professionals and consultants profess that was impossible.
(2)Brown's Ferry: So which's the worst: Insufficient training?? Allowing combustible cable insulation?? Employing personnel who shortcut safety reg's (assuming what they were doing was already prohibited, and, if not, why not??).
Your job is a result of TMI/Brown's Ferry accidents? So you're part of a new profession that wasn't supposed to exist?? (the industry said so many redundant safety features/processes were built into the designs and the construction that dangerous "accidents" couldn't happen)...
My point is not that we can't build safe reactors and operate them safely, but that we haven't done either; until we do, the risks are massive.
I'll dig up and email my source, which I'm sure the industry very quickly declared wild-eyed sensationalism.

OT ThreeMileIsland info for noncompos

Cue P.

Member

glennster

Well-known Member

Ken Macfarlane

Well-known Member

MarkB_MI

Well-known Member

Cue P.

Member

nonxcompos

New User